A market with asymmetric information can be viewed as a repeated exchange game between the informed sector and the uninformed one. In a market with risk-neutral agents, De Meyer [2010] proves that the price process should be a particular kind of Brownian martingale called CMMV. This type of dynamics is due to the strategic use of their private information by the informed agents. In the current paper, we consider the more realistic case where agents on the market are risk-averse. This case is much more complex to analyze as it leads to a non-zero-sum game. Our main result is that the price process is still a CMMV under a martingale equivalent measure. This paper provides thus a theoretical justification for the use of the CMMV class of dynamics in financial analysis. This class contains as a particular case the Black and Scholes dynamics.
Introduction
Information asymmetries are omnipresent in financial markets. We do not mean here insider trading which is illegal but agents on the market are de facto asymmetrically informed: institutionals have clearly a better access to information than private investors. They have access to more information, quicker, and they are better skilled to analyze it. Typically, they have more information on the companies whom shares they are trading and they have entire services analyzing the economic conjuncture. Aside these information about the economic health of the underlying firms, they also have access to an other kind of private information that is relevant to forecast the price evolution: they often serve as intermediary between their clients and the market. When receiving an important order from a client, they clearly receive a private information that will affect the short term price evolution. They will typically use this information in an optimal way to get the best execution price. This is the focus of the literature on optimal execution, as introduced in Almgren and Chriss [2001] .
In these situations everybody is aware that informational asymmetries exist and knows who are the informed agents. Informed agents' actions on the market are therefore analyzed by the uninformed agents in order to deduce the informative content behind these actions. As suggested in previous papers (De Meyer and Saley [2003] and De Meyer [2010] ), this phenomenon could partially explain the kind of price dynamics observed on the market.
These papers model the market with a single risky asset which is exchanged for counterpart a numéraire. For simplicity they consider a short period of time just after a single asymmetric information shock. Because the time period considered is short, it can be assumed that there is no consumption and the aim of the agent is to maximize the expected value of their final portfolio. The informational shock is materialized by a initial private random message m received by the informed player. This message will influence the final price L of the risky asset which can thus be viewed as a deterministic function L = L(m). L(m) contains in fact all the relevant information carried by m. Therefore the structure of the initial information asymmetry can be simplified. Since m is random, so is L(m). Denoting µ the probability distribution of L(m), the initial informational shock is now modeled by a initial lottery selecting L with probability µ once for all. Player 1 is informed of L while Player 2 just knows µ. After this initial information shock, players are exchanging assets during n consecutive trading rounds, using a trading mechanism. This is thus a repeated exchange game of incomplete informationà la Aumann and Maschler [1995] .
De Meyer and Saley [2003] analyzes a game between two risk-neutral market makers with asymmetric information. They focus on a very particular trading mechanism and proved that as market markers play more and more frequently (n going to infinity), the equilibrium price process converges to a continuous martingale involving a Brownian motion in its description. This result gives thus an endogenous justification for the appearance of the Brownian term in the price dynamics: it is seen as an aggregation of the random day after day noises introduced by the informed agents on their moves to avoid too fast revelation of their private information.
This idea was generalized in De Meyer [2010] that argues that a market with incomplete information can be modeled by a two player game between the informed sector and the uninformed sector. In first approximation these sectors are considered in De Meyer [2010] as individually rational and risk-neutral agents. In such a description the uninformed sector is typically made of an aggregation of a large number of agents. It is then difficult to describe precisely the set of all possible actions of all those agents (which would be a complete action profile, one for each individual agent). This is the reason for modeling the market by an abstract trading mechanism. Such a mechanism simply maps a pair of actions to the resulting share transfer between the two sectors. The uninformed sector is then represented by a "representative agent" that selects rationally the action in that action space. Five conditions are imposed on the trading mechanism to model real world markets. When those conditions are satisfied, the trading mechanism is called natural.
In games with natural trading mechanisms, it appears that the equilibrium price processes converge, as the trading frequency increases. The limit process belongs to a very particular class of Brownian martingale referred to as the class of "Continuous Martingale of Maximal Variation" (CMMV, see below definition 1).
In fact, the particular mechanism analyzed in [De Meyer and Saley, 2003 ] is a natural mechanism and the dynamics observed in that paper is a particular CMMV. Let us emphasize that the asymptotic behavior of the prices is completely independent of the natural trading mechanism used to model the market. We refer to that result as the universality of the CMMV class. 1
This universality of the CMMV class is still reinforced by the result of Gensbittel [2010] . This class is robust to the introduction of classical derivative assets: instead of considering just one risky asset, he considers a multi-asset model with one underlying asset and a family of monotonic derivatives. In that framework he shows that the limit of the price process of each asset is a CMMV.
In the present paper, we extent this universality result, showing that the CMMV class also appears in a model with risk-averse agents. This result suggests that the CMMV class should be used in finance to model asset price evolutions. Notice that Black and Scholes dynamics is a particular CMMV.
The content of this paper
The current paper analyzes the consequences of introducing risk aversion in the model. As mentioned above, the uninformed sector is made of a large number of individual agents that typically display risk-averse behavior. It is therefore natural to assume that the representative agent, called player 2, will be risk-averse. On the other hand, the informed agent (player 1) typically represents a big institutional investor and it is natural to model it as a risk-neutral agent.
This risk aversion is modeled with the introduction of a concave utility function in player 2's payoff: he maximizes the expected utility of the final value of its portfolio. Due to this utility function, we are not in front of a zero-sum game anymore as it was the case in the previous mentioned papers. This makes the analysis more involved, the notions of value and optimal strategies are here to be replaced by the notion of Nash equilibrium.
When dealing with very general trading mechanism with abstract action spaces, the notion of price is not obvious. In the setting of risk neutrality, as in De Meyer [2010] , the price L t at time t of the risky asset is defined as the conditional expectation of its final value L given the public information at that time. This makes sense in the risk-neutral case since this conditional expectation is precisely the price at which the uniformed agent would agree to trade this asset. But this doesn't make sense anymore in a risk-averse setting. We chose to bypass this issue by considering a particular exchange mechanism that naturally involves prices.
There are so many uninformed agents on the market that aside from its informational content, the action of player 1 will be quite marginal and the market without player 1 can be considered as a device that produces a price at which player 1 can buy or sell a unit of the asset. This amounts to view player 2 as a market maker.
We consider therefore a very simple mechanism where the uninformed sector is a market maker that chooses at each period q ∈ {1 . . . , n} a price p q for one share of the risky asset, and player 1 will have to decide whether he wants to buy (u q = 1) or to sell (u q = −1) at this price. Note that the price p q is thus the number of shares of the numéraire given in exchange for 1 share of the risky asset. Since we suppose that the numéraire has a liquidation value equal to 1, the price p q as thus to be interpreted as an actualized price of the risky asset. Both players try to maximize their utility for the liquidation value of their final portfolio.
We first prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a game with fixed length n. We then analyze equilibrium strategies. Under those strategies we analyze the law of the price process (p 1 , . . . , p n ) posted by player 2. Our next result is that this price dynamics is consistent with the classical financial theory of no-arbitrage: the so-called "fundamental theorem of finance" by Harrison and Pliska [1981] claims that if there is no arbitrage on the market, there exists an equivalent probability measure 2 , under which the actualized price process would be a martingale. In our model with risk aversion, the (actualized) equilibrium price process is not, in general, a martingale. However, as in Harrison and Pliska [1981] , there exists an equivalent probability measure under which this process become a martingale.
This result is quite surprising in a context where Player 1 can only buy or sell a limited amount of assets. Indeed, the no-arbitrage theory assumes that if there would exist a trading strategy leading to a positive final value at no initial cost, there would be such a demand for this portfolio that the prices on the market would be affected and this arbitrage would disappear. This argument fails in our model because in any case Player 1 can only buy a limited amount at each period.
We then analyze the asymptotics of the price dynamics as the trading frequency increases (n goes to infinity). The limit price process is a process in continuous time (where t ∈ [0, 1] is the proportion of elapsed trading periods). Our result is that under equivalent probability measure mentioned above, the limit price process is a CMMV.
Again, this result reinforces the universality of the CMMV class. More precisely it suggests that under the martingale equivalent probability measure, the price processes of the assets should be a CMMV. Note in particular that this class contains the most used dynamics in finance, which is one used in Black and Scholes [1973] . But there are plenty other dynamics in this class, that could be used to develop pricing and hedging models.
We now give a precise definition of CMMV: Definition 1. A continuous martingale of maximal variation 3 (CMMV) is a stochastic process Π in continuous time t ∈ [0, 1], which is a martingale that satisfies for all t:
where B is a standard Brownian motion and f : R × [0, 1] → R is a function which is increasing in its first variable.
Let us emphasize that they are two conditions in the above definition. One is that f (x, t) is increasing with x, and the other is that f (B t , t) is a martingale, which implies strong restriction on f . It follows in particular from Itô's formula that f must satisfy the time reversed heat equation:
3 Description of the model Let µ be a probability distribution on R. The game G n (µ) we are considering is the n-times repeated games that proceeds as follows: at stage 0, nature selects once for all L at random with probability distribution µ. Player 1 observes L, not player 2, and both players know µ. This initial information period is followed by n trading periods. At each period q ∈ {1, . . . , n}, player 1 decides to buy (u q = 1) or to sell (u q = −1) one unit of the risky asset. u q ∈ {+1, −1} is thus the action of player 1. Simultaneously, player 2 selects the price p q ∈ R of the transaction at stage q.
Remark 2. Choices are thus considered to be simultaneous: in our model, player 1 does not observe player 2's action before deciding whether to sell or buy. This can be surprising at first glance. Indeed, one usually assumes that the trader will buy or sell after observing the current market maker's price. In fact, we argue that this sequential model where player 1 reacts to the price posted by player 2 is equivalent to our model. Indeed, we prove in section 5 that, due to Jensen's inequality, the equilibrium strategy of player 2 in the simultaneous game is a pure strategy. Player 2's move p q is thus completely forecastable for player 1 at period q. Player 1 would get no benefit from observing p q before selecting u q . Therefore the equilibria in the simultaneous game are also equilibria in the sequential game.
That the game can be seen as a sequential game does not make mixed strategies useless. Indeed, in a sequential game with full information players select at each stage the action that will maximize their continuation payoff and this can be done with a pure strategy. However, this game is of incomplete information and mixing is the keystone for player 1 to avoid too fast revelation of his private information.
3 The terminology "CMMV" was introduced in De Meyer [2010] due to the following result. The nvariation of a martingale (Xt)
Consider the problem Mn of maximizing the n-variation V n X on the class of martingales X with final distribution µ (X1 ∼ µ). It is proved in De Meyer [2010] that the martingales that solve Mn, (i.e. martingales of maximal variation) converge in finite distributions, as n goes to infinity, to a process that satisfies the above Definition 1.
We denote h q the history of plays until round q, i.e. h q = (u 1 , p 1 , . . . , u q , p q ) and H q the set of all possible histories until round q. At the end of stage q, u q and p q are publicly revealed. Then both players know and remember all the past actions taken by both of them. Since the game has perfect recall we can apply Kuhn's theorem and there is no loss of generality to assume that players use behavioral strategies.
A behavioral strategy for player 1 in this game is a sequence σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) with
, with the usual convention that ∆(S) is the set of probabilities on a finite set S. A behavioral strategy for player 2 is a sequence τ = (τ 1 , . . . , τ n ) with τ q : h q−1 → τ q (h q−1 ) ∈ ∆(R), where ∆(R) denote the set of Borel probabilities on R. A triple (µ, σ, τ ) induces a unique probability distribution for (L, h n ). When X is a random variable, we denote E µ,σ,τ [X] its expectation with respect to this probability.
In this paper, player 1 is risk-neutral. His payoff in G n (µ) is then the expected value of his final portfolio, up to the normalization factor 1 √ n that will be explained in the forecoming remark:
The particularity of the current paper is that we consider a risk-averse player 2. The payoff he aims to minimize (we keep the formalism of the zero-sum games where player 2 is a minimizer) is then:
where H is a risk aversion function (convex and increasing).
Remark 3. The normalization factor 1 √ n introduced in the payoff functions requires some explanations. In this paper, we ultimately aim to analyze the price dynamics on a market in continuous time. We approach this continuous time market by a discrete time one, and the market is modeled as a repeated exchange game between a market maker and an informed player, with a large number n of repetitions. At each period, there is a maximal quantity α n of asset 1 that can be bought or sold at the price posted by the market maker. This maximal quantity α n measures some how the liquidity of the market: it represents the quantity of asset R that can be exchanged at once at the market price without affecting the price. The existence of a maximal quantity acts as a protection for the market maker against an insider trading. Would player 2 be a single fully rational player, he would prefer avoid trading with a more informed player 1, due to a kind of "No trade" theorem (see Milgrom and Stokey [1982] ). Because player 2 is an aggregation of different players, some of whose are in fact trading for liquidity reasons, he is unable to completely avoid trading and this is reflected here by setting α n > 0.
We next argue that α n should be proportional to
Indeed, this appears clearly in the model where player 2 is risk-neutral. The function H is then linear and the game can be considered as zero-sum. In this setting the behavior of the players is independent of α n which is just a normalisation factor of utilities. In fact this particular game corresponds to a natural exchange mechanism. It can be easily shown that this mechanism satisfies the five hypothesis mentioned above, and we know from De Meyer [2010] that the value V n of the game is such that Vn √ n converges to a finite quantity. This result points out that α n should be taken proportional 1 √ n in order to stay with bounded payoffs as n increases. The exchanged quantities will then remain bounded and in the limit converge to the quantities exchanged in the continuous time model. This normalization has no effect on the players in the risk-neutral case, but it has to be introduced in the risk-averse case: the lotteries player 2 is facing are of the same magnitude for all n.
Throughout this paper, we will make the following regularity assumptions on µ and H: A1: µ is a probability measure on [0, 1] absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. Its density function f µ is strictly positive and C 1 .
A2: H is a strictly positive, strictly convex and C 2 function and H ′ is Lipschitzcontinuous: there exists strictly positive ǫ and K such that for all x ∈ R : ǫ < H ′ (x) < K.
Observe that in A1 we assume that L takes only values in the [0, 1] interval. We could obviously change this assumption to any compact interval by just a renormalization.
The game analyzed in this paper is in fact quite simple and much simpler than the general games with abstract strategy spaces considered in [De Meyer, 2010] . However our proofs are very long and we have to apologize for the technicality of the following pages. The difficulties in the proofs come from different reasons.
The first difficulty is that strategies of the players in the game with n rounds of trading are defined on different spaces. For example we will identify Player 1's strategy set with the set of probabilities on {−1, +1} n × R. Is it therefore quiet difficult to speak of the convergence of those strategies. We bypass this difficulty using embedding methodsà la Skorokod, which are per se technical.
Next, equilibria in the finite game are defined implicitly as a fixed point, and there are no closed form formula to describe them. Proving the convergence of these equilibria is not straightforward.
Finally, we prove that the convergence is equivalent to the uniqueness of solution to a differential system with very strong nonlinearities. Those nonlinearity involve in particular the arbitrary risk aversion function H and the arbitrary density function f µ . This differential system is not covered by the classical literature on differential equations.
Due to the length of these proofs, we decided to make a first synthetic overview of the argument in the next section.
Results and structure of the paper
In the first part of the paper (sections 5, 6, 7), we analyse the game G n (µ) for a fixed number n of stages. We first prove in section 5 that some equilibria of G n (µ) can be found among the equilibria of the simpler game G n (µ) where the informed player 1 does not observe the actions of player 2, and player 2 is not allowed to randomize his moves. We then focus on the reduced game G n (µ).
We show in section 6 that this game can be completely reformulated: a strategy of player 1 can be identified with a probability Π n on the pair (ω, L) where ω = (u 1 , . . . , u n ). We prove in subsection 6.2 that at an equilibrium,
where Ψ n is a convex function and S n (ω) := 1 √ n n k=1 u k . The function Ψ n can be used to parameterized player 2's strategies. Indeed, player 2's strategy (p 1 , . . . , p n ) can be recovered from Ψ n . A pair of strategies can therefore be described by a pair (Π n , Ψ n ).
We further show in the same subsection that, in order to be an equilibrium in G n (µ), (Π n , Ψ n ) must satisfy the following conditions (C1) to (C4), where Π n denotes the marginal of Π n on (L, S n ), where λ n denotes the uniform probability on ω and where λ n is the law of S n (ω) when ω ∼ λ n .
where ∂Ψ n denotes the subgradient of the convex function Ψ n .
(C4): The marginal distribution Π n|Sn of S n under Π n , denoted ν n , is such that the density
Conversely, one can always associate an equilibrium to a pair (Π n , Ψ n ) satisfying the four conditions. We prove in the subsection 6.3 our first main result that claims the existence of a unique equivalent martingale measure as announced in the intorduction.
Theorem. Let (Π n , Ψ n ) be a pair satisfying the conditions (C1) to (C4), (p n q ) q=1,...,n be the price process that corresponds to Ψ n and Π n|ω denote the marginal distribution of ω under Π n . Then λ n is the unique probability equivalent to Π n|ω such that the price process (p n q ) q=1,...,n is a martingale when
This theorem justifies the following terminology: the law of the price process under λ n is referred to as the martingale equivalent probability in the sequel of the paper.
We next deal in section 7 with the problem of existence of these reduced equilibria. This existence could possibly be proved by classical methods and approximations, using Nash-Glicksberg's theorem. One of the interest of our alternative proof is to introduce an operator T λ : ∆(R) to ∆(R). This operator is the central tool to study the asymptotic properties of these equilibria.
To define this operator T λ , we first focus on conditions (C1) to (C3): for any measures λ and ν on R, there exists a unique pair (Π ν , Ψ ν,λ ) satisfying (C1) with λ n replaced by λ, (C2), (C3) and such that the marginal distribution of S n under Π ν is ν. Indeed, due to Fenchel lemma, condition (C3) can heuristically be interpreted by saying that S n is an increasing function 4 g of L:
There is essentially a unique increasing function g which satisfies that condition 5 and we find therefore heuristically that L = Ψ ′ n (S n ) = g −1 (S n ). This determines Π n which is then the joint law of (L, g(L)) when L is µ-distributed. This also determines Ψ n up to a constant which can be found in a unique way to satisfy (C1).
We are next seeking a measure ν that further satisfy (C4). There exists a unique probability ρ such that
With these notations, finding an equilibrium in G n (ν) is equivalent to find a measure ν satisfying the equation:
The existence of equilibrium in the game G n (µ) is finally proved in section 7 by showing that the operator T λn is onto the space of measures. We first prove the continuity of the operator T λn in term of Wasserstein distance W 2 . The onto property of T λn results then from an application of the KKM theorem. Our second main results follows:
Theorem. There exists a Nash equilibrium in G n (µ), and therefore there also exists an equilibrium in the original game G n (µ).
In the sequel of the paper, we focus on the equilibrium strategy of player 2, refereed to as the price process, and its properties when players play more and more frequently. In order to analyze the asymptotics of the price process, we have first to prove that any sequence ν n converges (in Wasserstein distance W 2 ), where for all n, ν n is a the solution of equation (3) Section 8 of the paper is devoted this proof. Remember that λ n is the law of 1 √ n n q=1 u q when u q are independent and centered. Due to the central limit theorem, λ n converges to the normal law that we denote λ ∞ . On the other hand, using a compactness argument, we can prove that any such sequence (ν n ) n∈N has an accumulation point ν satisfying
We then prove that there is a unique solution to this equation. This implies obviously that the sequence (ν n ) n∈N converges. To prove the above uniqueness result, we first prove 4 We remain very heuristical in our explanation at this point because ∂Ψ ♯ n is actually a correspondence and not a single valued function.
5 Would ν have no atom, we would have g(ℓ) = F As shown in 9, the convergence of ν n implies the convergence of the law of the price process under the martingale equivalent measure, i.e. when (u 1 , . . . , u n ) ∼ λ n . More specifically, the discrete time price process (p n 1 , . . . , p n n ) can be represented by the continuous time price process t → p n ⌊nt⌋ , were ⌊nt⌋ is the integer part of nt. We first show that the processes p n ⌊nt⌋ under the law λ n can be represented (Skorokhod embedding) on the natural filtration F of a Brownian motion on a probability space (Ω, F ,P ). Indeed, there exists a sequence of variables (p n q ) q∈{1,...,n} and an increasing sequence of stopping times (τ n q ) q∈{1,...,n} such thatp n q is F τ q n -mesurable, and has the same distribution as p n q when (u 1 , . . . , u n ) ∼ λ n . We show in Theorem 35 thatp n ⌊nt⌋ converges in finite dimensional distribution to a limit process Z t defined on the space (Ω, F ,P ) and that results to be a CMMV. This is our third important result:
Theorem. Let (p n q ) q∈{1,...,n} be an equilibrium strategy in the reduced game G n (µ). As n goes to infinity, the law of the stochastic process t → p n ⌊nt⌋ under λ n (i.e. when (u 1 , . . . , u n ) ∼ λ n ) converges to the law of a continuous martingale of maximal variation Z t .
We also show the convergence of the historical law of p n ⌊nt⌋ (i.e. when (u 1 , . . . , u n ) are distributed according to the equilibrium strategy of player 1) and we finally prove that this limit law is equivalent to the law of the CMMV Z t .
Reduced equilibrium
Definition 4. The reduced game G n (µ) is the game where player 1 does not observe player 2's actions and player 2 is not allowed to randomize his moves (he only uses pure strategies).
The aim of this section is to prove Proposition 7. It states that any equilibrium in G n (µ) is an equilibrium in G n (µ).
In this paper a pure strategy of player 2 will be denoted p. Such a strategy p is thus a vector (p 1 , . . . , p n ) where p q is a map H q−1 → R. p q (h q−1 ) denotes then the deterministic action taken by player 2 after history h q−1 . Remark however that since player 2 does not randomize before stage q, the action he will take at stage q is just a deterministic function of previous moves of player 1. Therefore, in this paper, a pure strategy of player 2 will be considered as a sequence (p 1 , . . . , p n ) where p q is a function {−1, +1} q−1 → R.
The intuition behind Lemma 5 hereafter is that to any mixed strategy of player 2, he will prefer the corresponding "average" pure strategy. More precisely, let σ be a reduced strategy of player 1 and let τ be any strategy of player 2. Since player 1 does not observe player 2's move when using σ, one can assume that he picks his actions u 1 , . . . , u n after observing L and before player 2's first move. (µ, σ) induces thus a probability on (L, u 1 , . . . , u n ). Player 2's strategy τ can then be viewed as a device to randomly chose (p 1 , . . . , p n ) once (u 1 , . . . , u n ) has been selected: one first select p 1 with the lottery τ 1 , then one selects p 2 with the lottery τ 2 (u 1 , p 1 ) and so on. Therefore τ determines the conditional law of p q given (u 1 , . . . , u q−1 ) and this conditionnal law does not depend on σ. Let f τ q (u 1 , . . . , u q−1 ) denote the expected value of this conditional law. Note that p τ := (f τ 1 , . . . , f τ n ) is then a pure strategy for player 2 since it does not depend on σ. We have thus:
Observe also that the law of p q given (u 1 , . . . , u q−1 ) is just the law of p q given (u 1 , . . . , u n , L). Indeed, given (u 1 , . . . , u q−1 ), p q must clearly be independent of (u q , . . . , u n , L) since (u q , . . . , u n , L) was chosen before p q and τ q just depends on (u 1 , . . . , u q−1 ). Therefore
We now compare the payoffs induced by a strategy τ with those induced by the corresponding strategy p τ .
Lemma 5. For any τ a strategy of player 2, p τ is such that for all reduced strategy σ of player :
Proof. To simplify notations, the expectation E µ,σ,τ is denoted E.
We now apply Jensen's inequality to the convex function H, and take into account the fact that u q and L are (u 1 , . . . , u n , L)-measurable:
Similarly, we have:
We also will need the following lemma:
Lemma 6. Let p be a pure strategy of player 2 and σ any strategy of player 1 (even non reduced). Then, there exists a reduced strategy of player 1 denotedσ (σ,p) which gives him the same payoff as σ against p, i.e. :
Proof. The strategy σ is not reduced, so σ q depends on (u 1 , . . . , u q−1 , p 1 , . . . , p q−1 ). But player 2 is completely deterministic since he uses strategy p. Therefore he plays action p q = p q (u 1 , . . . , u q−1 ), and the whole history p 1 , . . . , p q−1 is just a deterministic function of u 1 , . . . , u q−2 . In the arguments of σ q , we can replace p 1 , . . . , p q−1 by this function and we get in this way:
which is a reduced strategy and clearly:
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section:
Proof. For all player 2's strategy τ in G n (µ), we have:
where p τ is defined as above. Indeed the first inequality just indicates that the pure strategy p τ is not a profitable deviation from the equilibrium strategy p ⋆ in G n (µ). The second inequality comes from Lemma 5. Let σ be any strategy of player 1. With the notation of Lemma 6 we get:
where the inequality follows from the fact thatσ is a reduced strategy and can thus not be a profitable deviation from σ ⋆ for player 1.
Based on the previous proposition, equilibria in G n (µ) will be referred to as the reduced equilibria in G n (µ). In the sequel of this paper, we will only focus on the reduced equilibria of G n (µ).
Characterisation of equilibrium
In subsection 6.1 we give an other representation of the strategy spaces in G n (µ). This representation is needed in subsection 6.2, where we provide necessary and sufficient equilibrium conditions.
Finally, in subsection 6.3, we prove that the price process posted by player 2 in any equilibrium is a martingale when the past actions of player 1 are uniformly distributed. Moreover, we prove that the uniform distribution is the only probability on player 1's actions under which the price process becomes a martingale.
Alternative representation of the strategy spaces
When playing a reduced strategy player 1 does not observe player 2's actions and we can therefore assume that he selects his actions after getting the information L and before the first move of player 2. Thus, joint with µ, a reduced strategy σ induces a joint law Π n on (L, ω) where ω = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) belongs to Ω n := {−1, +1} n . The marginal Π n|L of Π n on L is clearly µ. We can further recover the strategy σ from Π n computing the conditional probabilities given L. Therefore the player 1's strategy space may be viewed as the set of probabilities Π n in ∆(R × Ω n ) such that Π n|L = µ.
We first prove that player 2's strategy space in G n (µ) can be identified with a set X n of random variables.
Let us consider the set of pure strategies P of player 2. If p ∈ P, then p q is a function Ω n → R which is measurable with respect to (u 1 , . . . , u q−1 ). Note that the strategy p only appears in the payoff functions (see equations 1 and 2) thought the quantity X n,p (ω) :
We can therefore identify the strategy space of player 2 with the set
Next lemma characterizes this set. Let λ n be the uniform probability on Ω n . Under λ n , (u q ) q=1,...,n are mutually independent, and have zero expectation. We denote
Proof. Let X ∈ X n . Then X = X n,p for some p ∈ P. Since Ω n is a finite set, X as a map from Ω n to R belongs to L 1 (λ n ). Moreover, using that p q is (u 1 , . . . , u q−1 ) measurable:
Let 1 {u k =1} denotes the random variable that takes the value 1 if u k = 1 and 0 otherwise. An easy computation shows that 1 {u k =1} = uq+1 2 . One gets therefore
where:
Now observe that
. Summing up those equalities for k = 1 to n, we get:
But X n (u 1 , . . . , u n ) = X and X 0 = E λ (X) = 0. We get thus:
for the strategy p defined in (5).
Let us make more precise the relation between X and the strategy p such that X = X n,p .
Proposition 9. Let X ∈ X n . There exists a unique pure reduced strategy p such that X = X n,p . Moreover, we have the explicit formula:
Proof. Let p j be (u 1 , . . . , u j−1 )-measurable. Then observe that if j < q:
On the other hand, if j > q,
We get thus E λn [p j u q u j |u 1 , . . . , u q−1 ] = p q if j = q and 0 otherwise. Let now X be in X n . According to the previous lemma, X = X n,p for some p. We can therefore write
We can now reformulate the completely reduced game G n (µ) as follow: player 1 selects Π n ∈ ∆(Ω n × R) such that Π n|L = µ. Simultaneously player 2 chooses X ∈ X n .
The payoff functions are now given by the formula:
Characterization of equilibrium strategies in G n (µ)
The main result of this subsection is Corollary 14 that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a pair (Π ⋆ n , X ⋆ ) to be an equilibrium in G n (µ). As a first step in the proof of that result, we prove in Proposition 10 that any history ω = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) has a positive probability at equilibrium. We express this property saying that the equilibrium strategy Π ⋆ n of player 1 is completely mixed. We next argue in Proposition 11 that if a strategy X of player 2 is such that there exists a completely mixed best response of player 1, then X has a very particular form: X(ω) is a convex function of S n (ω).
The next result is Proposition 12. It claims that if player 2 plays a strategy X = Ψ n (S n ) for a convex function Ψ then Π n is a best response to X if and only if Π n (L ∈ ∂Ψ n (S n )) = 1, where ∂Ψ n is the subgradient of the convex function Ψ n , as defined in equation (7).
Finally the first order condition for Player 2's strategy Ψ(S n ) are derived in Proposition 13.
Proposition 10. If player 2 has a best reply to a strategy Π ⋆ n of player 1 in G n (µ) then Π ⋆ n is completely mixed.
Proof. Π ⋆ n is a probability on (L, ω) where ω = (u 1 , . . . , u n ). It induces therefore a marginal distribution on ω q = (u 1 , . . . , u q ). Denote Γ q the set of ω q such that Π ⋆ n (ω q ) > 0. We want to prove that Γ n = Ω n . Assume on the contrary that Γ n = Ω n . We can then define q ⋆ as the smallest q such that Γ q = Ω q := {−1, +1} q . There is then a history (u 1 , . . . , u q ⋆ −1 ) ∈ Γ q ⋆ −1 such that one of the histories (u 1 , . . . , u q ⋆ −1 , 1) or (u 1 , . . . , u q ⋆ −1 , −1) does not belong to Γ ⋆ q . Whence, this history (u 1 , . . . , u q ⋆ −1 ) has a positive probability under Π ⋆ n and is followed by a deterministic move of player 1 at stage q ⋆ . But after observing this history, player 2 could increase his benefit by posting a higher or lower price according to the forecoming deterministic move of player 1. This contradicts the hypothesis that there is a best reply against Π ⋆ n . Therefore, assuming Γ n = Ω n leads to a contradiction.
The following notions are classical and useful concept to deal with convex functions: The subgradient ∂Ψ(s) of a convex function Ψ at s is defined as:
The Fenchel transform of Ψ is defined as the convex function Ψ ♯ (x):
As well known (see Rockafellar [1970] ), if Ψ is lower semi-continuous, then Ψ = (Ψ ♯ ) ♯ . Furthermore, we have the following equivalence due to Fenchel:
We are now ready to state our next result:
Proposition 11. If player 1 has a completely mixed best reply Π ⋆ n to a strategy
Proof. Suppose that player 2 is playing X ⋆ and player 1 wants to maximize his payoff
After observing L = ℓ, he will select an history ω ∈ V ℓ where V ℓ is the set of ω ′ that solve the maximization problem A(ℓ) in equation (10).
Since all history ω has a positive probability under Π ⋆ n we conclude that the set of values ℓ such that ω ∈ V ℓ can not be empty. Otherwise ω would never be selected by player 1 and would have zero probability under Π ⋆ n . Now remark that it follows from the definition of A that for all ℓ and for all ω:
Therefore, for all ω, for all ℓ:
and thus for all ω:
As observed above, for all ω, the set of ℓ such that ω ∈ V ℓ is not empty. For those ℓ, inequality (12) is an equality, and thus:
We get therefore X ⋆ (ω) = Ψ n (S n (ω)) with Ψ n (s) = A ♯ (s). Observe that as supremum of affine functions of s, the map s → Ψ n (s) is convex.
Finally, since X ∈ X n we get with Lemma 8 that E λn [Ψ n (S n (ω))] = 0.
With this notation, we have the following result:
Proposition 12. Consider the strategy X ⋆ (ω) = Ψ n (S n (ω)) of last proposition. A strategy Π n of player 1 is a best response to X ⋆ if and only if:
Proof. As explained in the beginning of the previous proof, Π n is a best response to X ⋆ if and only if Π n (ω ∈ V L ) = 1. It follows from the definition of V ℓ that ω ∈ V ℓ if and only if A(ℓ) = S n (ω)ℓ − X(ω). On the other hand, it follows from the definition (10) of A that for all r, A(r) ≥ S n (ω)r − X(ω). Combining these two relations, we have that A(r) ≥ S(ω)(r − ℓ) + A(ℓ) and thus S(ω) ∈ ∂A(ℓ) or equivalently ℓ ∈ ∂A ♯ (S n (ω)) = ∂Ψ n (S n (ω)). Therefore ω ∈ V ℓ if and only if ℓ ∈ ∂Ψ n (S n (ω)), and the proposition is prooved.
The next proposition expresses the first order conditions of player 2 optimization problem. Π ⋆ n|ω just denotes the marginal distribution of ω under Π ⋆ n . Proposition 13. A strategy X ⋆ is a best reply to a strategy Π ⋆ n of player 1, if and only if λ n has a density with respect to Π ⋆ n|ω given by the formula:
for a constant α n .
Proof. Suppose that X ⋆ is a best reply to a strategy Π ⋆ n of player 1. Then X ⋆ is a solution to the minimization problem of player 2:
Note that the map X → E Π ⋆ n [H(LS n − X)] is convex in X and we are in front of a convex minimization problem. In such a problem the first order conditions are both necessary and sufficient. We get these first order conditions considering for fixed δ ∈ X n the map G : ǫ ∈ R → G(ǫ) := E Π ⋆ n (H(LS n − X ⋆ + ǫδ)). This map must reach a minimum at ǫ = 0.
Observe now that H is C 1 and so is G. We get then
, and therefore, for all δ ∈ X n :
Since δ is just a function of ω, this equality can also be written as:
where
Since λ n puts a positive weight on every history, Π ⋆ n|ω is absolutely continuous with respect to λ n and has a density y n = dΠ ⋆ n|ω dλn . We can rephrase previous conditions as: for all δ ∈ X n ,
This relation can interpreted as an orthogonality relation in L 2 (λ n ) with the scalar product A, B := E λn [AB] . The space X n must then be orthogonal to y n Y n . But Lemma 8 shows that X n = {1} ⊥ . Therefore y n Y n is co-linear with 1: it is equal to a positive constant that we denote 1 αn . Since y n = dΠ ⋆ n|ω dλn > 0, λ n is absolutely continuous with respect to Π ⋆ n|ω and we get
Corollary 14. A pair of strategy (Π ⋆ n , X ⋆ ) is an equilibrium in G n (µ) if and only if ∀ω :
, where Ψ ⋆ n is a convex function that jointly satisfy with Π ⋆ n the following conditions (C1),(C2),(C3),(C4).
From now on, a pair (Π ⋆ n , Ψ * n ) satisfying (C1),(C2),(C3),(C4) will be referred to as an equilibrium in G n (µ) (instead of the pair (Π ⋆ n , X * ), with X * := Ψ * n (S n ).) Remember that according to the results of section 6.1, such a pair (Π ⋆ n , Ψ * n ) fully describes a pair of equilibrium strategies (σ * , τ * ) in the original game G n (µ).
The price process and the martingale equivalent measure
Before proving the existence of equilibrium in section 7, let us emphasize that the above characterization of equilibrium implies that under an appropriate equivalent measure the price process is a martingale.
Consider an equilibrium (Π ⋆ n , Ψ ⋆ n ), and denote p 1 , p 2 (u 1 ), . . . , p n (u 1 , . . . , u n−1 ) the corresponding pure strategy of player 2.
When (u 1 , . . . , u n ) are randomly selected by player 1 with lottery Π ⋆ n , the law of this process p is called the historical law. We now prove that if (u 1 , . . . , u n ) are selected by the lottery λ n , the process is a martingale.
Theorem 15. The price process (p n q ) q=1,...,n is a martingale under the probability λ n .
Proof. With equation (6) we have:
The last equality follows from the fact that, conditionally to u 1 , . . . , u q−1 , the vector (u q , S n ) and (u n , S n ) have the same law under λ n . The price process p n is written as a conditional expectation of a terminal variable with respect to an increasing sequence of σ-algebras. It is then a martingale under the probability λ n .
We further aim to prove that λ n is the unique probability on Ω n that makes the price process a martingale.
Theorem 16. λ n is the unique probability on Ω n that makes the price process (p q ) q=1,...,n a martingale.
Proof. Indeed, letλ n be a probability on Ω n under which the price process is a martingale.
We find with the similar computation as that made to get equation (6) that:
Since p is a martingale under λ n , we find 
Existence of equilibrium
In this section we aim to prove the existence of an equilibrium in G n (µ). According to section 5, we can focus on the game G n (µ). According to Corollary 14 we just have to prove the existence of a pair (Π n , Ψ n ) such that conditions (C1) to (C4) are satisfied.
These conditions on (Π n , Ψ n ) lead to new conditions on (Π n , Ψ n ) where Π n ∈ ∆(R 2 ) is the marginal of Π n on (L, S n ). As explained in the next subsection, there corresponds an equilibrium (Π n , Ψ n ) to a pair (Π n , Ψ n ) satisfying these new conditions. We therefore will focus on these pairs (Π n , Ψ n ).
The marginal Π n
Π n is a probability on Ω n ×R and it induces a marginal law Π n ∈ ∆(R 2 ) for the pair (S n , L). (C1), (C2) and (C3) are in fact conditions on (Π n , Ψ n ). (C4) is the unique condition that involves the conditional law of L given ω. As proved with the first claim of the forthcoming Lemma 17, it turns out that (C4) implies the following necessary condition on Π n and Ψ n : (C4'): There exists a constant α n such that
It is useful to note that various equilibria (Π n , Ψ n ) could have the same marginal Π n . On the other hand, we will prove in Corollary 26 the existence of pairs (Π n , Ψ n ) that satisfy (C1), (C2), (C3) and (C4'). To prove the existence of reduced equilibrium in G n (µ) we therefore need the second claim of the next lemma:
C3) and (C4'), where Π n = Π n|(L,Sn) . 2/ Conversely, to any (Π n , Ψ n ) satisfying (C1), (C2), (C3) and (C4'), there corresponds at least one equilibrium (Π n , Ψ n ) such that Π n|(L,Sn) = Π n .
Proof. We start with the first claim. We just have to prove that (C4) implies (C4'). Let Φ be a continuous and bounded function. According to (C3) we have:
which is exactly our condition (C4').
We now prove the second claim. Let (Π n , Ψ n ) satisfy (C1), (C2), (C3) and (C4'). Consider then the probability Π n induced by the following lottery: select first L and S n according to Π n . If S n = s, select an history ω with the uniform probability on the set
The marginal of Π n on (L, S n ) coincides with Π n and (Π n , Ψ n ) satisfies therefore (C1), (C2) and (C3).
Observe then that under Π n , L is then independent of ω given S n and therefore the conditional law of (L, S n ) given ω coincides with the conditional law of (L, S n ) given S n . So:
|S n ], and (C4) then follows from (C4').
Reformulation of (C1), (C2) and (C3)
In this subsection we show that a pair (Π n , Ψ n ) satisfying (C1), (C2) and (C3) is completely determined by the marginal law ν := Π n|Sn of S n .
It will be convenient to introduce the following notation: ∆(R 2 , µ, ν) is the set of probability distributions on (L, S n ) ∈ R 2 with respective marginal laws µ and ν.
Definition 18. For ν ∈ ∆(R), we define φ ν (ℓ) := F −1 ν (F µ (ℓ)) and γ ν (s) := F −1 µ (F ν (s)) where F µ and F ν are the cumulative distribution functions of µ and ν, and F −1 µ and F −1 ν are their right inverses i.e. F −1 ν (y) = inf{x | F ν (x) > y}. We further define:
Finally, for λ ∈ ∆(R), we set:
Lemma 19. Let (Π, Ψ) be a pair where Ψ is a convex function and where Π ∈ ∆(R 2 ) satisfies Π |Sn = ν. Then (Π, Ψ) satisfies (C1), (C2) and (C3) if and only if (Π, Ψ) = (Π ν , Ψ ν,λn ).
Proof. We first prove that the pair (Π ν , Ψ ν,λn ) satisfies (C1), (C2) and (C3). We start by observing that Π ν ∈ ∆(R 2 , µ, ν). Indeed, according to the definition of Π ν the marginal law of L is µ. On the other hand, since µ has no atom, U := F µ (L) is uniformly distributed and it is well known that the Smirnov transform F −1 ν (U ) is ν-distributed. Therefore the marginal law of Π ν on S n is just ν.
Ψ ν,λ is a convex function since γ ν is increasing and thus Γ ν is convex. It further satisfies (C1) since, due to equation (16)
Π ν satisfies (C2) since it belongs to ∆(R 2 , µ, ν). γ ν is right continuous and therefore it follows from the definition of Γ ν that ∂Ψ ν,λ (s) = [γ ν (s − ), γ ν (s)] where γ ν (s − ) is the left limit of γ ν at s. Under Π ν , S n = φ ν (L). Therefore, condition (C3) is equivalent to:
We first prove that for all x:
Let A := {s|F ν (s) > x} and α := F −1 ν (x). It results from the definition of (18) is proved.
On the other hand, F ν (α − ) = lim u→α,u<α F ν (u). But if u < α, u ∈ A c and thus
Since F µ is increasing and one to one, we get therefore
) which is exactly (17) according to the definition of γ ν , and (Π ν , Ψ ν,λ ) satisfies thus (C3).
We now prove the converse statement. Let Π n belong to ∆(R 2 , µ, ν) and Ψ n be a convex function such that (Π n , Ψ n ) satisfies (C1), (C2) and (C3). We have to prove that (Π, Ψ) = (Π ν , Ψ ν,λn )
Being convex, the function Ψ n (s) has a derivative ρ(s) at any point except maybe on a countable set. The function ρ can be extended into a right continuous function defined for all s ∈ R. We then obtain that for all s,
Observing that ρ −1 is an increasing function, there are at most countably many points in A := {ℓ|ρ −1 (ℓ − ) = ρ −1 (ℓ)}. Since µ is non atomic, µ(A) = 0 and thus Π n [S n = ρ −1 (L)] = 1. It follows that, under Π n , (L, S n ) has the same law as (L, ρ −1 (L)). Since Π n ∈ ∆(R 2 , µ, ν), we conclude that ρ −1 (L) is ν-distributed when L is µ-distributed. As observed in the beginning of this proof φ ν (L) ∼ ν when L ∼ µ. It turns out that φ ν is the unique right continuous increasing function having that property 6 , and we may therefore conclude that ρ −1 = φ ν .
It follows on one hand that Π n = Π ν . On the other hand, ρ = φ −1 ν = γ ν . Therefore, ∂Ψ n (s) = ∂Γ ν (s) for all s. As a consequence Ψ n = Γ ν + c where c is a constant. Since Ψ n satisfies (C1), we conclude that c = −E λn [Γ ν ] and thus Ψ n = Ψ ν,λn as announced.
As explained in the introduction of this section, we are seeking for pairs (Π n , Ψ n ) satisfying (C1), (C2), (C3) and (C4'). According to Lemma 19, this is equivalent to find ν such that (Π ν , Ψ ν,λn ) satisfies (C4').
(C4') is a condition on the density of λ n with respect to the marginal of Π ν|Sn = ν. It expresses that this density ∂λn ∂ν is proportional to Y ν,λ defined as:
Since H ′ is strictly positive, so is Y ν,λ . Therefore we define:
as the unique constant α ν,λ such that α ν,λ .Y ν,λ .ν is a probability measure (the notation α ν,λ .Y ν,λ .ν refers to the measure ζ such that
Definition 20. For λ ∈ ∆(R), T λ is defined as the map from ν ∈ ∆(R) to T λ (ν) := α ν,λ .Y ν,λ .ν ∈ ∆(R), where α ν,λ and Y ν,λ are defined in equations (19) and (20).
With this definition, we get:
Lemma 21. For all ν, the pair (Π ν , Ψ ν,λn ) satisfies (C4') if and only if T λ n (ν) = λ n .
Proof. This results from the definition of T λ and the condition (C4').
The operator T λ is the central tool of our analysis. It is used both to prove the existence of equilibria and to prove their convergence.
In the next subsection, we analyze the continuity property of T λ .
Continuity of T λ
We first introduce the Wasserstein distance W 2 and we remind some of its useful properties. Our the continuity result for T λ is stated in Proposition 24. Its technical proof is given in Annex 11.2.
6 Let indeed f1, f2 be two right continuous increasing functions such that fi(L) ∼ ν when L ∼ µ. Then for all a ∈ R, Ai := {ℓ|fi(ℓ) ≥ a} is a closed set. Since fi is increasing, Ai must be an half line and we must have therefore Ai = [αi, ∞[. Since fi(L) ∼ ν and Fµ is continuous, we get:
Therefore Fµ(α1) = Fµ(α2) and thus α1 = α2, since Fµ is strictly increasing according to the hypothesis A1 on µ. As a result, A1 = A2, or in other words: for all ℓ and for all a, f1(ℓ) ≥ a if and only if f2(ℓ) ≥ a. We conclude therefore that f1 = f2.
Definition 22. For d ∈ N * , we define P 2 (R d ) the Wasserstein space of order 2 on R d , as:
we define the Wasserstein distance between ν 1 and ν 2 as:
W 2 is clearly finite on P 2 (R d ) and (P 2 (R d ), W 2 ) is a metric space. This metric is useful to deal with weak convergences (as indicates Proposition 23).
Remember that a sequence ν k ∈ ∆(R d ) is said to converge in law, or to convergence weakly in ∆(R d ) to ν if and only if for any bounded continuous function φ :
There exists also a weak convergence in P 2 (R d ): ν k converges to ν weakly in P 2 (R d ) if and only if for any continuous functions φ satisfying for some constant C ∈ R:
The following proposition is well known (see for instance theorem 6.9 in Villani [2008] , or Mallows [1972] for a proof). It makes the link between weak convergences and W 2 convergence.
Proposition 23. The three following statements are equivalent:
The continuity result is expressed in the next proposition.
Proposition 24. If ν k and λ k are two sequences of measure in P 2 (R) that converge in W 2 distance to ν and λ, then
The proof of this proposition is postponed to the Annex 11.2.
KKM theorem and existence of equilibrium.
We are now ready to state the existence of a Nash equilibrium in G n (µ). According to Lemma 17 and 21, to prove the existence of an equilibrium in G n (µ), we have to show that there exists ν n ∈ ∆(R) such that T λ n (ν n ) = λ n . Remember that λ n ∈ ∆ f (R) where ∆ f (R) is the set of probability measures on R with finite support. Observe next that T λ (ν) is defined by a density function with respect to ν. In particular T λ (ν) is absolutely continuous with respect to ν, which is denoted T λ (ν) ≪ ν (i.e. for all measurable set A,
The next theorem can then be applied to T λn to conclude the existence of equilibrium.
Theorem 25. A map T : ∆ f (R) → ∆ f (R) that is continuous for the W 2 metric and satisfies T (ν) ≪ ν for all ν is necessarily onto.
Proof. Let λ be a measure in ∆ f (R) and denote K its support. If T (ν) ≪ ν, then necessarily the support of T (ν) is included in the support of ν. Therefore T maps ∆(K) to ∆(K). ∆(K) can be identified with the |K|-dimensional simplex hereafter denoted ∆ and the restriction of T to ∆ is a continuous map. It further preserves the faces F i := {x ∈ ∆|x i = 0}. It follows from an argument used in Gale [1984] that T is onto. Indeed, let λ ∈ ∆ and define C i := {x ∈ ∆|T (x) i ≤ λ i }. Since T is continuous, C i is clearly a closed subset of ∆. Furthermore, if x ∈ F i then x i = 0 and thus T (x) i = 0 ≤ λ i . We conclude therefore that for all i, F i ⊂ C i . We next argue that ∆ ⊂ ∪ i C i . Indeed, for all x ∈ ∆, T (x) ∈ ∆. There must exists i such that T (x) i ≤ λ i . Otherwise we would have for all i, T (x) i > λ i , and summing all those inequalities we would get 1 > 1. Therefore there exists i such that x ∈ C i . As announced, ∆ ⊂ ∪ i C i . According to KKM theorem (see the particular version presented in Mertens et al. [2014] page ) there exists x ∈ ∩ i C i . So for this x we get for all i that T (x) i ≤ λ i . Since the sum over i of both sides equal to 1, we infer that these inequalities are in fact equalities, and thus T (x) = λ.
Since our map T λn is onto, we conclude that for all n, there exists ν n such that T λn (ν n ) = λ n . The corresponding pair (Π νn , Ψ νn,λn ) satisfies (C1), (C2), (C3) and (C4'). We conclude then with Lemma 17-2, that:
Corollary 26. There exists a reduced equilibrium in G n (µ).
Convergence of ν n
In order to describe the asymptotics of the price process, we have first to analyze the asymptotics of any sequence (ν n ) satisfying for all n the equation T λ n (ν n ) = λ n . For now on, (ν n ) will denote any such sequence.
First observe that λ n is the law of S n = n i=1 u i √ n when (u 1 , . . . , u n ) are independent and centred. It follows from the central limit theorem that λ n converges in law to λ ∞ := N (0, 1).
Observing that the second order moments E λn [S 2 n ] = 1 for all n, this weak convergence in ∆(R) implies (see Proposition 23) the W 2 -convergence of λ n to λ ∞ .
We first prove in Lemma 27 that the sequence (ν n ) is relatively compact. As a consequence we infer with Corollary 28 that any sequence (ν n ) must have an accumulation point satisfying
It turns out that equation (21) for ν is equivalent to the claim that Ψ ν,λ∞ is a smooth solution to a differential system (see Proposition 29).
We next claim in Theorem 30 that this differential problem D has a unique solution and therefore the equation T λ∞ (ν) = λ ∞ has a unique solution ν (see Corollary 31). This implies the convergence of ν n to this unique solution ν, as stated in Corollary 32.
Lemma 27. The sequence (ν n ) is relatively compact: any subsequence of (ν n ) has an accumulation point in P 2 (R).
Proof. We first prove that E νn [S 2 n ] is bounded. It follows immediately from the assumptions A2 on H as well as from the definition of Y ν,λ and α ν,λ (see equation (19)), that ǫ < Y ν,λ < K, and
According to the definition of λ n , we have E λ n [S 2 n ] = 1. And thus:
We conclude with Markov-Tchebichev inequality that for all
This indicates that the sequence of measures (ν n ) is tight: for all
This tightness property implies with Prokhorov's theorem that there exists a subsequence ν n(k) of ν n that weakly converges to some ν ∈ ∆(R). Since the second order moment are bounded, we may select a subsequence of ν n(k) such that the second order moments converge. According to Proposition 23, this implies the W 2 -convergence of ν n(k) .
Corollary 28. Any accumulation point ν of the sequence (ν n ) satisfies T λ ∞ (ν) = λ ∞ where λ ∞ = N (0, 1).
Proof. Take a subsequence ν n(k) converging to ν in W 2 . Since we also have λ n(k) → λ ∞ in W 2 , we may apply our continuity result on T (see Proposition 24) to conclude T λ∞ (ν) = λ ∞ .
Proposition 29. Suppose that ν is a probability measure such that T λ∞ (ν) = λ ∞ with λ ∞ = N (0, 1), then:
1/ The function Ψ ν,λ∞ (see Definition 15) is C 2 . 2/ The pair (ψ, c) :
) is a solution of the following differential system D:
This proposition is proved in Annex 11.3.
Theorem 30. There exists at most one pair (ψ, c) solution to the system D.
This Theorem is proved in Annex 11.4.
Corollary 31. There exists a unique measure ν such that T λ∞ (ν) = λ ∞ where λ ∞ = N (0, 1)
Proof. If ν 1 and ν 2 are two solutions of T λ∞ (ν) = λ ∞ , then the pairs (Ψ ν i ,λ∞ , 1 α ν i ,λ∞ ) for i = 1, 2 would be solutions of the system D according to Proposition 29. As a result of Theorem 30: Ψ ν 1 ,λ∞ = Ψ ν 2 ,λ∞ . Thus the derivatives of these functions also coincide: γ ν 1 = γ ν 2 where γ ν i are defined in Definition 14. Since F µ is one-to-one, this implies that F ν 1 = F ν 2 and thus ν 1 = ν 2 .
Corollary 32. The sequence (ν n ) converges to the unique solution ν of T λ∞ (ν) = λ ∞ .
Proof. Otherwise there would exists a subsequence (ν n(k) ) that would not admit ν has accumulation point. This is impossible since this sequence would have an accumulation pointν according to Lemma 27 which should satisfy: T λ ∞ (ν) = λ ∞ . According to Lemma 31, we would then have a contradiction:ν = ν.
9 Convergence of the price process to a CMMV Our analysis in this section applies to any sequence (Π n , X n ) of reduced equilibria in G n (µ). We will focus on the price process (p n q ) q=1,...,n posted by player 2 in these equilibria. In a reduced equilibrium, the strategy (p n q ) q=1,...,n of player 2 is pure (non random) but his moves depend on the past actions ω = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) of player 1 which are random. The process (p n q ) q=1,...,n is then a stochastic process. Its law when ω is Π n|ω -distributed is called the historical law. On the other hand, the law of the price process when ω is λ n -distributed is called the martingale equivalent law.
We have seen in Theorem 15 that when ω ∼ λ n , the process (p n q ) q=1,...,n is a martingale. Furthermore λ n is the unique probability equivalent to Π n|ω that has this property as stated in Theorem 16.
Our purpose on this section is to analyze the asymptotics of the distribution of the prices process. In subsection 9.1, we analyze the limit of the martingale equivalent laws. In subsection 9.2, we analyze the asymptotics of the historical laws.
Convergence of the martingale equivalent law.
Let (Π n , X n ) be a sequence of reduced equilibria in G n (µ). We already know that X n = Ψ νn,λn (S n ) and that Π n = Π νn for a measure ν n satisfying T λ n (ν n ) = λ n . According to formula (13), the price posted a period q is:
It is convenient to introduce the process Z n : t ∈]0, 1] → Z n t := p n ⌊nt⌋ where ⌊x⌋ is the largest integer less or equal to x. This is a continuous time process that jumps to the next value of p n q at time t = q n . We analyze in this section the asymptotics of the law Q n of Z n when (u 1 , . . . , u n ) are endowed with the probability λ n .
Let us introduce the notation
. Formula (22) can be written as:
Heuristically we have that
. From Corollary 32, we have that ν n converges to ν. Furthermore, according to Donkster theorem, S n ⌊tn⌋ converges in law to B t where B is a standard Brownian motion. We can heuristically expect therefore that Z n t converges in law to
. This will be our focus in this section. Observe next that Z must be a CMMV. Indeed Ψ ′ is an increasing function and we may apply the following lemma.
Lemma 33. If B is a Brownian motion on a filtration (F t ) and if g is an increasing function R → R, then
Proof. Due to the Markov property of the Brownian motion, we have
Note that f is the convolution of g with a normal density kernel. This convolution preserves the class of increasing functions and f is thus indeed increasing in x. It is further C 2 due to the smoothing property of the normal kernel.
Let us now prove formally the convergence of Z n t to Z t . We start by reminding the definition of the weak convergence in finite distributions of a sequence of stochastic processes:
Definition 34. A sequence (Z n ) of processes converges in finite dimensional distribution to a process Z if and only if for all finite family J of times (t 1 < · · · < t k ), the random vectors (Z n t ) t∈J converge in law to the random vector (Z t ) t∈J .
Our main theorem is then:
Theorem 35. Under the equivalent martingale measure, (Z n ) converges in finite dimensional distribution to the CMMV Z where
Proof. We will prove this convergence by proving that the W 2 (ρ n , ρ) → 0 when ρ n and ρ are respectively the laws of the vectors (Z n t ) t∈J and (Z t ) t∈J . We use "Skorokhod representation" techniques to get that result. Let (Ω, A ,P ) be a probability space on which B is a Brownian motion. In this section, unless otherwise stated, all expectations onΩ are taken with respect toP .
(B 1 )|B t ] can be considered as a process on that space.
We will introduce hereafter a sequence of processesZ n defined onΩ such that: 1/Z n and Z n have the same laws.
Theorem will then be proved. Indeed, (Z n , Z) is a pair of processes on the same probability space (Ω, A ,P ). The joint joint law of (Z n t , Z t ) t∈J is a probability distribution on R 2|J| with respective marginals ρ n and ρ. Therefore:
In order to construct those random variablesZ n , it is convenient to apply the embedding techniques already used in De Meyer [2010] . Let F t denote the natural filtration of the Brownian motion B. Define τ n 0 = 0 and, recursively, τ n q+1 as the first time t > τ n q such that
. Since the one-dimensional Brownian motion is a recurrent process τ n q < ∞ almost surely and clearlyũ q :
) has the same distribution as u q under λ n . Indeedũ q ∈ {−1, +1} and E[ũ q ] = 0. They are furthermore independent since the increments
j=1ũ j has the same distribution as S n q under λ n . We set:z
z n has then the same distribution as p n n . Furthermore, if we define:
the process (z n q ) q=1,...,n has the same distribution as the process (p n q ) q=1,...,n under λ n , as it follows from equations (23) and (25). We next define:
It is then clear thatZ n and Z n have the same laws which claim 1 in (24). We next prove claim 2:
We next argue that both terms of the right hand side go to zero as n goes to ∞. Let us start with the second one. First observe that all the martingales on the Brownian filtration are continuous (see Revuz and Yor [1999] , theorem V.3.5), and
was not converging to zero, there would exists a subsequence
) does not admit Z t as accumulation point in L 2 . We prove in Lemma 36 that τ n ⌊nt⌋−1 → t in L 2 . The sequence n(k) can thus be selected such that
⌊n(k)t⌋−1 → t almost surely. By continuity we get then that (Z τ
) converges almost surely to Z 1 and the convergence also holds in L 2 since (Z t ) is uniformly integrable (
is bounded). This contradicts the definition of the subsequence n(k).
Assume now that the first term does not converge to zero. There would exist a subsequence n(k) such thatz
. With the mean value theorem, we conclude that there exists
converges in L 2 to B 1 . The subsequence n(k) can thus be selected in such a way that B τ n(k) n(k)−1 converges to B 1 almost surely and so does x n(k) . Since Ψ n = Ψ νn,λn converges uniformly to Ψ ν,λ∞ which is C 2 , we may apply the forecoming Lemma 37 to conclude thatz n n converges almost surely to
, it follows from the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem thatz
in contradiction with the definition of the subsequence n(k). Hence, as announced both terms go to zero. Therefore both claims in (24) are satisfied by the processZ n and Theorem 35 is thus proved.
We next prove the announced lemma.
Proof. As well known:
2 ) = q n On the other hand, τ n q+1 − τ n q is independent of F τ n q . Therefore, τ n q = q−1 i=0 τ n i+1 − τ n i is a sum of independent random variables with expectation 1 n . Moreover we have V ar(τ n ⌊nt⌋ ) → 0 when n → ∞. Indeed:
where C is the Burkholder's constant for p = 4 (see Theorem IV.4.1 in Revuz and Yor [1999] ).
Therefore:
Replacing q by ⌊nt⌋, we get claim 1 as announced. It is also well known that E[(B τ n n−1
With equation (26) we get:
Claim 2 is thus also proved.
Lemma 37. Let (Ψ n ) be a sequence of convex functions that converges uniformly to a C 1 function Ψ. Let (x n ) and (z n ) be two real sequences such that: (1) x n converges to x. (2) for all n: z n ∈ ∂Ψ n (x n ). Then z n converges to Ψ ′ (x).
Proof. Since z n ∈ ∂Ψ n (x n ), we get with u ∈ {−1, +1} that:
Since the right hand side is bounded, any subsequence of (z n ) has an accumulation point. All these accumulation points must be in ∂Ψ(x). Indeed, if a subsequence (z n(k) ) converges to z, we have for all y:
Letting k go to infinity, we get then for all y: Ψ(y) ≥ Ψ(x) + z(y − x) and therefore z ∈ ∂Ψ(x) = {Ψ ′ (x)} since Ψ is C 1 . All subsequence of (z n ) has Ψ ′ (x) as accumulation point, this is equivalent to the claim that z n converges to Ψ ′ (x).
Convergence of the historical law
Let (Π n , X n ) be a sequence of reduced equilibria in G n (µ). We already know that X n = Ψ νn,λn (S n n ) and that the marginal Π n of Π n on (L, S n n ) coincides with Π νn for a measure ν n satisfying T λ n (ν n ) = λ n . We further know that ν n converges to the unique solution ν of T λ∞ (ν) = λ ∞ . Therefore, Π n converges to Π ν in W 2 distance. Our aim in this section is somehow to analyze the asymptotics of the law Π n of (u 1 , . . . , u n , L), or more specifically, the law of the price process p n q (u 1 , . . . , u q−1 ) when (u 1 , . . . , u n , L) ∼ Π n . This law is called the historical law. Note that we can't speak of the convergence of Π n itself because the space on which probability Π n is defined depends on n. We will use the embedding technics introduced in the previous subsection.
Let y n (ω n ) denote the density of ∂Π n|ωn ∂λn , so y n is a function of ω n = (u 1 , . . . , u n ). In the previous subsection, we created sequencesS n q = B τ n q andũ of random variables on (Ω, A ,P ) a probability space on which B is a Brownian motion in such a way thatS n q and u have the same distribution as S n and u under λ n .
Settingỹ n := y n (ũ 1 , . . . ,ũ n ), we infer thatỹ n is a probability density on (Ω, A ,P ), and under the probabilityP n :=ỹ n .P , the process (ũ 1 , . . . ,ũ n ) is Π n|ωn -distributed.
We first prove the following lemma:
Proof. Our first task will be to define a variableL n on the space (Ω, A ,P ) such that the process (ũ 1 , . . . ,ũ n ,L n ) is Π n -distributed underP n .
This can be done as follows:ω n := (ũ 1 , . . . ,ũ n ) is F τ n n measurable. Let V n := B τ n n +1 − B τ n n . UnderP , V n ∼ N (0, 1) and is independent of F τ n n . Sinceỹ n = y n (ω n ), V n will have the same law N (0, 1) and will still be independent of F τ n n underP n . Let F ωn denote the cumulative distribution function of the conditional law of L conditionally to ω n under Π n . We then setL n := F −1 ωn (F N (0,1) (V n )).L n has the same conditional law givenω n as L given ω n under Π n . Therefore (ω n ,L n ) underP n has the same law as (ω n , L) under Π n .
We now prove that, underP ,L n converges to Ψ ′ ν (B 1 ) almost surely. Indeed, since L n belongs Π n -almost surely to ∂Ψ n (S n n ), we infer thatL n belongsP n -almost surely to ∂Ψ n (S n n ). SinceP n is equivalent toP , we conclude thatL n ∈ ∂Ψ n (S n n )P -almost surely.
Since Ψ n converges uniformly to Ψ ν ∈ C 2 and sinceS n n converges almost surely to B 1 , we apply Lemma 37 to conclude thatL n convergesP -almost surely to Ψ ′ ν (B 1 ). Therefore:
We define
It follows from Corollary 14 that
. We setỸ n := Y n (ω n ). We clearly haveP n -almost surely, and thus alsoP -almost surely,
is just a function ofω n , it follows that:
Note next thatS n n isω n -measurable andL n is a function of the pair (ω n , V n ). Since V n is independent of F τ n n we get then:
We claim thatỸ n converge in
We next claim that H ′ (L nS n n − Ψ n (S n n )) convergesP -almost surely toỸ . Indeed, according to equation (27), (L n ,S n n ) converges almost surely to (Ψ ′ ν (B 1 ), B 1 ). Furthermore Ψ n converges uniformly to Ψ ν . Therefore Ψ n (S n n ) convergesP n -almost surely to Ψ ν (B 1 ).
Since H ′ is continuous, we conclude that H ′ (L nS n n − Ψ n (S n n )) convergesP n -almost surely toỸ . Since H ′ is further bounded, this later convergence holds also in L 1 and thus:
] does not admitỸ as accumulation point in L 1 .
Since F t is the natural filtration of a Brownian motion, it results from theorem V.3.5 in Revuz and Yor [1999] that the martingale r t := E[Ỹ |F t ] is continuous and uniformly integrable. Therefore, due to the optional stopping theorem, we have
Since τ n n converges in L 2 to 1, there is no loss of generality to assume, possibly after selection of a smaller subsequence, that n(k) further satisfies that τ n(k) n(k) convergesP -almost surely to 1. But then r τ n(k) n(k) converges almost surely to r 1 = EP [Ỹ |F 1 ] =Ỹ . But due to the uniform integrability of the martingale r t , this convergence also holds in L 1 , in contradiction with the definition of the subsequence n(k). Therefore, as announced,
According to Corollary 14, ∂λn ∂Π n|ω = α n .Y n , and thus
Yn for a constant β n . Therefore for all ω n , y n (ω n ) = βn Yn(ωn) andỹ n = βñ Yn . SinceỸ n is a probability density under Theorem 16 claims that the martingale equivalent distribution Q n converges to a limit distribution Q. The next theorem is the counterpart of this result for the historical distribution. It claims that P n converges to a limit distribution P which is the law of the process Z whenΩ is endowed with the probability measureỹP . Therefore the limit distributions P and Q are equivalent.
This result is the main result of this paper. It claims that the asymptotics of the historical price process is a CMMV under an appropriate martingale equivalent measure Q.
Theorem 39. The price process Z n t under the probability Π n converges in finite dimensional distribution to the process Z whenΩ is endowed with the probabilityỹ.P whereỹ = loss of generality that the sequence n(k) is further such thatZ
Conclusion
To conclude this paper we would like to make some remarks on the obtained results.
The first one is about the dual game. Our first attempt to analyze this game was using duality techniques. The dual game G ⋆ n (φ) is in fact the reduced game where Player 1 is allowed to select privately the value of L but his payoff is decreased by a penalty φ(L). The function φ is known by both players. Strategies and payoffs are the same for Player 2. A strategy Π for Player 1 is a joint probability on (ω, L) but there is no constraint on the marginal Π |L . It can be easily proved that if (Π ⋆ , p) is an equilibrium in G ⋆ n (φ) and if
is an equilibrium in G n (µ). It can then be proved that there exists a function φ n and an equilibrium (
One of the reason for introducing the dual game was that the asymptotics of the reduced equilibria in G ⋆ n (φ) was quiet easy to analyze (with φ independent of n). However, to analyze the asymptotics of the equilibria in G n (µ) using the dual game, we would have to analyze a sequence of equilibria in G ⋆ n (φ n ) for an appropriate sequence of φ n . This makes the analysis more involved and explains why we decided to limit our paper to the game G n (µ).
The second remark is about the generality of our results. The results obtained in [De Meyer, 2010] were somehow more general than those obtained in the present paper: in the risk-neutral case, if the mechanism belongs to the class of natural mechanisms, then the price process at equilibrium converge to a CMMV for all sequences of equilibria in G n (µ). The current paper is only concerned with one particular natural mechanism for which the price process is explicit. For this mechanism we do not analyze the asymptotic of any sequence of equilibria, but only of sequences of reduced equilibria: we prove that the price processes at a reduced equilibrium converges to a CMMV under the risk-neutral probability. This naturally raises two questions: do we have the same asymptotic for any sequence of equilibria in our game? And will this dynamic appear for more general price based mechanism? We conjecture a positive answer to both questions but are presently unable to prove it.
Finally, we just want to mention an alternative approach to our results. It would indeed be possible to introduce continuous time games quite similar to the Brownian games introduced in De Meyer [1999] : a strategy Π n in the reduced game can be viewed as a pair (y n , ρ n ) where ρ n is a conditional law of L given ω and y n is the density Lemma 40. Let (Π ⋆ n , Ψ ⋆ n ) be an equilibrium and p the corresponding pure strategy of player 2. Then we have: p n q (u 1 , . . . , u q−2 , 1) > p n q (u 1 , . . . , u q−2 , −1) Proof. Since Ψ n is convex, its derivative exists except on a countable number of points. We may therefore write:
Denote U = { −n+1+2k √ n |k ∈ 0, . . . , n − 1} the set of possible values of S n n−1 , where S n q := 1 √ n q k=1 u q . We first prove that χ is strictly increasing on U . Let x, y be two successive points in U (i.e. y = x + 2 √ n ) and assume that χ(x) = χ(y). We have then:
Since Ψ ′ is increasing, this is the integral of a positive function which is 0. This is only possible if Ψ ′ n (y + v) − Ψ ′ n (x + v) = 0 for almost every v, which means in particular that
[. This implies that Ψ is differentiable at the point z = x + 1 √ n which is a possible value for S n = S n n−1 + un √ n . The event {S n = z} has a strictly positive probability under λ n and we infer also that Π n (S n = z) > 0 since λ n and Π n|ω are equivalent probabilities as it follows from condition (C4) and the fact that H ′ is strictly positive.
Since ∂Ψ n (z) = {Ψ ′ n (z)}, we infer from (C3) that Π n (L = Ψ ′ (z)) > 0. According to (C2), L is µ-distributed under Π n and we would therefore have µ({Ψ ′ n (z)}) > 0, which contradict our hypothesis A1 that µ has a density with respect to Lebesgue measure. This concludes the proof that χ is increasing on U .
According to formula (13), we get:
Since V is independent of S q−1 , we get therefore p n q (u 1 , . . . , u q−1 ) = r(S q−1 ) where r(x) := E λn [χ(x + V )] is a strictly increasing function on the set of possible values of S n q−1 .
The continuity of T λ
The aim of this subsection is to prove Proposition 24, which is usefull to prove the existence of an equilibrium in section 7.
We will prove the continuity of the operator step by step. The following lemma are useful in the proof of the continuity.
Lemma 41. The mappings ν → Φ ν and ν → Γ ν are continuous from (P 2 (R), W 2 ) to the set of convex functions on respectively ]0, 1[ and R with the topology of uniform convergence.
Proof. Let ν 1 , ν 2 be two measures in P 2 (R) and x ∈]0, 1[.
The last inequality follows from Cauchy Scwharz theorem. The right hand side does not depend on x ∈]0, 1[, therefore:
It results for work of [Dall'Aglio, 1956] and [Fréchet, 1957] that W 2 (ν 1 , ν 2 ) may be explicitly computed in the case of one dimensional probability distributions: minimizing R | x − y | 2 dπ(x, y) is equivalent to maximizing E π (xy), which amounts to maximizing cov(XY ) with X ∼ ν 1 and Y ∼ ν 2 . This maximum is reached when X and Y can be written as increasing functions (here F −1 ν 1 and F −1 ν 2 ) of the same uniform random variable
Since f µ is bounded from below by ǫ > 0 ( assumption A1) we conclude:
Then we proved that the mapping ν → Φ ν is 1 ǫ 2 -Lipschitz continuous for the uniform norm.
We now prove that ν → Γ ν is also Lipschitz continuous.
Indeed from the definition of Γ ν and Φ ν we get that the ∂Φ ν (ℓ) = [φ ν (ℓ − ), φ ν (ℓ)] and thus by Fenchel lemma :
The two functions Φ ♯ ν and Γ ν just differ by a constant, and since Γ ν (0) = 0 we find
As well known Fenchel transform in an isometry for the uniform norm 7 . We conclude that the mapping ν → Γ ν is also Lipschitz continuous for the uniform norm.
Proof. Let L be a random variable with law µ.
where the last equality follows from equation (30).
1+x 2 is bounded, we have:
The first term of the right hand side goes to zero according to Lemma 41. Next observe
Let indeed f and g be two lower semi continuous convex functions
Interchanging f and g we get therefore for all x: |f
Since the right hand side doesn't depend on x, we get:
The reverse inequality follows from Fenchel lemma:
and we have a similar formula for E ν [Θ(S n ).Y ν,λ (S n )]. According to claim 2 in Lemma 43:
and formula (32) follows. According to the Definition 19 we get
With formula (32) for the particular Θ ≡ 1, we get that
Since Y ν,λ is bounded from below by ǫ > 0 (assumption A2 on H), we conclude then that α ν k ,λ k → α ν,λ . Finally combining this result with formula (32), we get the convergence announced in formula (31) and the corollary is proved.
Proof of Proposition 29
Proof. Let ν satisfy the equation T λ∞ (ν) = λ ∞ . This implies that λ ∞ has a strictly positive density with respect to ν, and therefore ν has a density with respect to λ ∞ . In turn this implies that it has also a density f ν with respect to the Lebesgue measure. This implies in particular that f ν is continuous.
We first deal with the smoothness of Ψ ν,λ∞ . Remember that Ψ ν,λ∞ differs from Γ ν just by a constant. Γ ν was defined as an integral of γ ν (s) = F −1 µ (F ν (s)). Since F µ is a strictly increasing and continuous map from [0, 1] to [0, 1], its inverse is itself continuous. Since F ν is also continuous, it follows that Γ ν and Ψ ν,λ∞ are C 1 and Ψ ′ ν,λ∞ = γ ν .
We next prove that γ ν is absolutely continuous 8 . This will imply on one hand (see theorem 7.18 in Rudin [1987] ) the existence of a function g integrable with respect to the Lebesgue measure such that γ ν (s) = s −∞ g(t)dt and on the other hand (by the Lebesgue differentiation theorem) that γ ν is almost surely differentiable and for almost every s: γ ′ ν (s) = g(s). The first claim of the proposition will then be proved by establishing that g, which is only defined up to negligeable set, admits a continuous version.
ν is absolutely continuous: Since ν is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, its cumulative distribution function F ν is an absolutely continuous function 9 .
We next observe that F −1 µ is Lipschitz continuous. According to A1, f ν is C 1 on [0, 1] and strictly positive. Let then κ > 0 be such that κ < f µ . Fors < s, we set b = F −1 µ (s) andb = F −1 µ (s) then:
Therefore, we have: The function γ ν = F −1 µ (F ν (s)) introduced in Definition 15 is therefore absolutely continuous. Indeed, since F ν is absolutely continuous, for ǫ > 0 and [a n , b n ] disjoint real intervals, there exists δ such that: n≥0 |b n − a n | < δ ⇒ n≥0 |(F ν (a n ) − F ν (b n )| < κǫ Suppose that n≥0 |b n − a n | < δ. Then:
Since f µ is C 1 (see conditions A1) and positive, F −1 µ is itself C 1 and F −1′ µ (u) = 1 fµ(F −1 (u))
. Since F ν is absolutely continuous, it is almost surely differentiable and F ′ ν (s) = f ν (s), according to Lebesgue differentiation theorem. Therefore, with the composition rule, we conclude:
Since Ψ ν,λ∞ is C 1 , and Π ν satisfies (C4): Π ν (L ∈ ∂Ψ ν,λ∞ (S)) = 1, we infer that L is almost surely equals to Ψ ′ ν,λ∞ almost surely. Since the right hand side of this equality is continuous, it is the continuous version of g we were seeking. Ψ ν,λ∞ is thus C 2 which is the first claim of our proposition and for every s: For all this section, we set θ := ψ 1 − ψ 2 . θ is then a C 2 function. Indeed, ψ i solves which already implies that ψ i has a second order derivative and is therefore C 1 . Since we may express the second order derivative from equation D-1 as a continuous function of s,ψ(s) and ψ ′ (s), we have that ψ ′′ (s) is itself continuous and ψ(s) is C 2 .
According to D-4 we have 
But, according to Lemma 46 the right hand side does not depend on i.
Proof of Theorem 30.
Let c denote the common value c := c 1 = c 2 . Our two functions ψ 1 and ψ 2 are now solutions to the same differential equation:
where F (s, x, y) := cN (s) H ′ (sy − x)f µ (y) Due to our assumptions A1, A2 on f µ and H, F is C 1 with respect to (s, x, y). Therefore, according to Cauchy-Lipschitz theorem, ψ 1 and ψ 2 must coincide since they are both solution of the same differential equation and have the same initial conditions ψ(s 0 ), ψ ′ (s 0 ) at s = s 0 .
